Abstract-Living organisms are under permanent pressure to take decisions with an impact on their success. Such decisions require information, which can be formulated in the precise sense of Shannon information. Since information processing is costly for organisms, this creates an adaptive pressure for cognition to be as informationally parsimonious as possible. Combining information theory with the theory of reinforcement learning for modeling tasks, we present a number of quantitative analyses how the cognitive burden of an agent deriving from a task can be relieved by the environment and, more specifically, its embodiment, i.e. how the agent "controller" is linked to the environment, via perception (in principle, but not further considered here) and action (this paper's main focus). The methodology presented offers a path towards a formal and quantitative treatment of Paul's and Pfeifer's concept of morphological computation in particular and their envisaged larger picture of offloading of computation onto the environment dynamics in general. In particular, it offers additional evidence for the central importance of the embodiment for the success of cognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the goals of the studies of Artificial Life is to identify universal principles governing the dynamics of organisms, which are not tied to a particular substrate and which abstract away the particular biological "implementation", thus carrying over to artificial agents. Various approaches, such as dynamical systems modeling [1] , cellular automata [2] , [3] and others have been suggested for this purpose. In the last decade, a new class of information-theoretic approaches has been receiving increasing attention. In contrast to the former, it aims at addressing aspects of Artificial Life in a mechanism-free way: instead of mechanisms modeling particular phenomena, one specifies (e.g. optimality) principles which result in the desired phenomenon, without making assumptions about which mechanisms would actually "implement" these principles. This allows for different choices of mechanisms as long as they produce the same macrodynamics. It provides a mesoscopic level of modeling between high-level, phenomenological and low-level, fine-grained Alife models.
II. INFORMATION AND COGNITIVE PROCESSING
Information theory has already been recognized as an important potential tool for cognitive modeling only shortly after its introduction in [4] , namely in the context of cybernetics and biology [5] - [7] . Evidence for information-maximization principles in biology [8] , [9] and for sensors operating at the physically possible limits of information acquisition [10] - [13] indicates that informational optimality is a candidate for a principle of central importance to biological organisms.
To capture this, one needs to cast an agent operating in its environment as a control scenario where an agent interacts with the environment exerting a certain amount of control over it [14] - [16] . The informational picture of the perception-action loop has studied in various contexts and scenarios [17] - [20] . and allows one to formulate fundamental limits on the minimal amount of information required for particular tasks, be it a reduction of environmental entropy [14] or the navigation to a target position from a random starting position [16] . In Shannon's original scenario there is no mechanism to formulate a particular "semantics" or purpose of how transmitted information is to be actually used. However, the information bottleneck method demonstrates how to separate relevant from irrelevant portions of Shannon information [21] ; this extends to agent scenarios by "qualifying" information via a utility function which attaches a value to each action an agent takes in a particular state [22] . In the case of rewards delayed over a prolonged period, this utility can be modeled by so-called Markovian Decision Processes, MDPs (studied in Reinforcement Learning), and combined with the information-theoretic view [23] - [25] .
To summarize these considerations: for an agent to take a decision that achieves particular utility in its world, a certain minimum amount of information processing is necessarily required. With aforementioned hypothesis that information is costly for organisms, this suggests that organisms would obey a principle of information parsimony, minimizing the information required to achieve a sufficient utility [13] .
Assuming that the information processing cost gives a quantification of the "cognitive load" of an agent, we are going to study how this cognitive load can be partly relieved by the environment. It will turn out that, in this view, not just structure and dynamics of the environment per se are important, but also how it relates to the given task, and specifically, also the embodiment of the agent. Embodiment we will here intend to mean how precisely the agent is linked into the environment 1 This suggests an informational interpretation of the phenomenon of "morphological" or "environmental" computation which has been postulated as basis for the success of suitably embodied agents [27] , [28] .
The paper is structured as follows: in Sec. III we introduce notation, notions and principles of the MDPs models, in Sec. IV we expand them towards the informational framework, in Sec. V we present experiments and results, concluding in Sec. VI with a discussion.
III. MODEL
We now present the model from [23] which will be used for the experiments. The agent's preferences and decision process is modeled as a Markovian Decision Process (MDP). MDPs are a popular approach for modeling sequences of decisions taken by an agent facing delayed accumulation of rewards. The structure of the rewards defines the tasks the agent is to achieve. The present paper will restrict itself to a simple navigation task, but the formalism is far more general [29] . We first introduce general notation and the MDP concept.
A. Notation and Definitions

1) Probabilities:
We first introduce probabilistic notation: uppercase characters X, Y, Z, . . . for random variables, lowercase characters x, y, z, . . . for the values they assume and curved characters X , Y, Z, . . . for their respective domains, always assumed finite. The probability that a random variable X assumes a value x ∈ X is written P (X = x), or p(x) for simplicity when there is no danger of confusion. In particular, writing p(x) we will not make an explicit distinction between the distribution of the random variable X and the probability value p(x) for the 1 Since space is limited and we consider here only the case of full access to the world state, embodiment in this paper corresponds formally to just the series of mappings At → S t+1 , t = 0, 1, 2, . . . in Fig. 1 (see corresponding text for explanations) . In general, however, the sensors are also included (e.g. [25] , [26] ). Furthermore, we will not make the occasionally emphasized distinction between "real" and "simulated" scenarios in using the term embodiment.
particular outcome x ∈ X . Write p(x, y, z) for the joint distribution of random variables X, Y, Z, and p(y|x) for the conditional distribution of Y given X.
2) Entropy and Mutual Information: Given a random variable X, define its entropy H(X) as H(X) := − x∈X p(x) log p(x) with log the binary logarithm. Thus the entropy will be expressed in bits, a measure of the uncertainty about the outcome of the random experiment X. For jointly distributed variables X, Y , the entropy is defined as H(X, Y ) := − x∈X y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x, y) which is equivalent to the entropy of the (single) joint random variable (X, Y ). For the random variable pair X, Y , the conditional entropy is de-
Finally, define the mutual information between X and Y as
i.e. the reduction in uncertainty about the outcome of Y if the outcome of X is known.
3) Markovian Decision Processes (MDPs):
Informally, an MDP is a model for an agent taking sequential decisions in an environment with the following properties: (1) The world consists of states and an agent which has a policy that determines which actions it selects in which states. (2) After each action taken, the agent obtains a reward (possibly negative). These rewards are cumulated over the lifetime of the agent and determine its achieved utility. (3) Being Markovian, MDPs have no hidden states. This means that, in principle, the agent has full access to the state of the world. We will discuss this assumption briefly in Sec. IV-C. For the particular study, this is not a restriction.
We now formally define MDPs, adopting in the notation from [29] with slight modifications. A Markovian Decision Process is defined by its set of states S, its set of actions A, and the pair (P
′ ∈ S and a ∈ A; here P s ′ s,a is the probability that by performing an action a in a state s, the agent will move to state s ′ and R s ′ s,a is the expected reward for this particular transition. , an agent can employ a policy π which specifies its decision process: an action a in a state s is selected with probability π(a|s). Over the course of a single run, an agent will accumulate a reward 
This equation can be used as a fixed point iteration (value iteration) for V π by inserting an estimate for V π on the right side and obtaining an improved estimate for it on the left side until convergence. Sometimes it is convenient to further decompose this equation into the Q π function which distinguishes the values attained for a given state s as different actions a are applied:
is the utility attained if, in state s, the agent carries out action a, and after that begins to follow π. This representation of the utility allows one to directly evaluate different actions a in a given state s.
In the traditional MDP optimization one now seeks a policy π * which maximizes the -unique -value function V * (s) for all states s. Here, however, we will be interested in a modification of the problem, incorporating the decision costs into the problem.
4) Notes on the MDP Definition:
Before we proceed, we mention some conventions used here. First, we assume transition probabilities P s ′ s,a into states which are not successors of s to be 0. Furthermore, here we only consider navigation tasks and model the goal states of our experimental scenarios as absorbing states which the agent cannot leave once reached. This is does not affect the generality of the approach.
Third, in the traditional MDP definitions, one assumes that in the most general case different states s may have different action sets A s . Here we deviate from this in that we require the action set A to be the same over all states s. The rationale for this requirement is at the core of our interpretation of the decision maker as agent: the embodiment of the agent implies a consistent set of "atomic" actions available to the agent throughout the world -an embodied agent always "takes its actions with it" and the available set of action choices from which the agent selects does not change from state to state 3 . The effect of actions, however, will in general differ in various ways from state to state. This defines the choice of embodiment (A t → S t+1 in Fig. 1 ). This is, from the point of MDPs a seemingly minor technical point which can be easily accomodated 4 and has no tangible consequences. However, this is an assumption about the embodiment, i.e. about an action set available to the agent throughout the world in a particular consistent (or inconsistent) way, and will turn out in Sec. V-B to have major consequences, but only once we take the information costs of decision making into consideration.
IV. INFORMATION IN THE DECISION PROCESS
A. Overview and Rationale
In this paper, we are not concerned with the cost of the learning process itself, and delegate this consideration to a generic evolutionary or otherwise adaptive "black box" algorithm (concretely, the algorithm in Sec. IV-D) which computes the policies. The criterion that we demand instead is that the resulting policy will be informationally parsimonious. We will now make this notion precise.
First, some general qualitative considerations: if there is only one optimal policy for the MDP, then that policy is unambiguous and has a given information processing cost. However, if there are multiple optimal policies, then asking for the informationally cheapest one among these optimal policies becomes more interesting. Even more interesting is when we do no longer demand that the solution be perfectly optimal. After all, strict optimality of a single criterium is not typical for biologically relevant scenarios, where many other considerations come into play. Thus, if we only require the expected reward E[V (S)] to achieve a "sufficiently" large value, the information cost for such a suboptimal (but informationally parsimonious) policy will be generally lower. As extreme case consider a "blind" agent without information processing cost: it follows the same (but possibly probabilistic) policy independently of the state it is in. We now make these notions precise and reiterate the methods to compute these policies, following [23] .
B. Core Model
Consider an MDP (P s ′ s,a , R s ′ s,a ) (state set S and action set A, as in Sec. III-A3). One can consider an agent graphically as a Bayesian Network, Fig. 1 . The random variables S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , . . . denote the (complete) state of the world at times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Depending on S t , the action A t at each time t is selected according to the policy π(a t |s t ) which is fixed throughout the run. Depending on the particular given state s t and the action selected a t , the new state is generated according to probability distribution p(s t+1 |s t , a t ) ≡ P st+1 st,at which encodes world dynamics and embodiment in our picture. The decision cost incurred by the agent is given by the mutual information
(essentially a reformulation of (1)). Note that we consider (4) independent of time: we assume a "steady state" where we do not start the decision process at a specific time but "tap" randomly into the decision process. We will thus simplify the discussion by assuming a fixed distribution of the states p(s) for all time steps.
With these assumptions, the information cost given by (4) then depends only on the state distribution p(s) and the policy π and, since we here consider p(s) as fixed, the only variable of interest becomes π. We now proceed to determine a policy π which is informationally parsimonious, i.e. which minimizes I(S; A) for a given utility level E[V π (S)].
C. Informationally Optimal Policies
For didactic reasons, we describe the issue of informationally parsimonious solutions in two steps. Consider first only optimal strategies achieving the (unique) optimal value function V * (s). This is only achieved if a (not necessarily unique) optimal policy π * is used by the agent. If the optimal policy is not unique, then one can impose an additional optimality principle amongst the optimal policies, namely seeking one that is also informationally parsimonious, i.e. that, in addition, minimizes I(S; A) as given by (4) , when π * is substituted for π. Such a policyπ * is called informationally optimal.
An informationally optimal policyπ * can be interpreted in various ways: (1) amongst the optimal policies, it requires the least amount of (Shannon) information to distinguish the states S the agent is in; (2) it can be interpreted as the strongest restriction (in terms of information) of the MDP to a process where the state can only be partially observed (a partially observable MDP) but where still an optimal value can be reached without the use of memory (see also [25] ); (3) it determines the minimally required sensory processing power for a memoryless agent to achieve an optimal policy.
To compute informationally optimal policies, one first determines the optimal value function V * (s) in one of the well-established ways (e.g. by alternating value iteration and then selecting greedy policies, Sec. III-A3) [29] . With the optimal value function V * (s) one then uses the Lagrangian formalism to formulate the unconstrained minimization problem
for infinite (in practice very large) β where the expectation E is taken over the joint distribution of states S and actions A given by p(s, a) = π(a|s)p(s). This turns out to be virtually identical with the so-called rate-distortion problem from information theory [21] , [30] , for which the Blahut-Arimoto fixed point iteration is well established. It consists of a double iteration alternating updates for the policy π and the resulting action distribution p(a) = s π(a|s)p(s) to compute an informationally optimal policyπ * :
where π (k) and p (k) (a) are the estimates for policy and action distribution in the k-th iteration step and Z is a normalization factor. Under mild conditions, this iteration converges to a solution for (5) . As in [23] , we call the resulting mutual information I(S; A) for a value-wise and informationally optimal policyπ * relevant information for the given MDP.
D. Informationally Suboptimal Policies
We now introduce the general methodology for suboptimal policies, policies that achieve a particular, but no longer optimal, value E[V π (S)]. In Sec. IV-C, where we considered optimal policies only, we computed first the optimal value function V * (s) and from it, via (3), Q * (s, a). This optimal value which does not depend on the policy and is universal for an MDP scenario was used in the iterations (6), (7) . This is no longer true, however, when we seek policies π that are informationally optimal at a suboptimal value level, since in these cases, the value function V π (s) and its associated utility Q π (s, a) will in general again depend on the policy.
While we still can write the Lagrangian minimization task as
now not only I(S; A), but also Q π (s, a) depends on the policy π. Thus a solution for (8) must be self-consistent not only with respect to (6), (7), but also with respect to the Bellman equation (2) . This double self-consistency criterium can be used to derive an algorithm for finding solutions for (8): a single step of value iteration (2) is followed by a single step of the Blahut-Arimoto update (6), (7), repeating until convergence. This method was proposed in [23] , and the universal convergence of an extension of this algorithm has been conjectured [25] .
The computations in the following will all use this algorithm 5 . For β → ∞, the algorithm computes an optimal strategy that is also informationally optimal, consistent with (5) which uses the optimal Q * directly. For smaller β, the algorithm produces policies π that are informationally optimal for a given value E[V π (S)]. The trade-off curves in Fig. 3 can be read in two ways: either as the least information I(S; A) to reach a particular value E[V π (S)] or the best value E[V π (S)] that can be reached for fixed information I(S; A). In particular, in the latter, E[V π (S)] will increase monotonically with growing I(S; A).
V. EXPERIMENTS
We consider two main scenarios. In both, we use a square grid world with a varying goal for each of the scenarios. An agent is located in a cell of the grid world, and can take one of four actions, moving it north, east, south or west from the current cell of the agent.
To implicitly specify the goal position in the scenarios, we define the reward structure R s ′ s,a as follows: for each step taken outside the goal state, the reward is −1 (penalty). The grid world is finite and its boundaries are delimited by "walls"; if an action moves the agent into the walls, the agent does not move, but incurs the usual reward −1. Once the goal is reached, the agent does not move away from it and all further rewards are 0: the task has finished. The value function V π (s) gives the negative of the expected duration of the travel from 5 In the scenarios we are considering, we estimated or calculated solutions for the extreme cases β → ∞ and β → 0 as "sanity check" benchmarks. For intermediate values of β, strictly spoken, we cannot guarantee optimality, but we have grounds to believe that the algorithm converged to the actual optimal solution in our scenarios; the results are plausible and consistent with the confirmed limit cases. Further work is aiming to conclusively validate this assumption. In the following, when we talk about optimal policies, we consider thereby policies π found by the algorithm, without further discussion. 
A. Value-Information Trade-Offs for Goal Variations
We now specify the scenarios in detail. Consider a 11× 11 square (Fig. 2) . Here, we consider two cases: a goal at the top right corner of the grid (A) and a goal in the center of the grid (B). Assuming that the start position is equidistributed over the grid, case B has the shorter average shortest path lengths to the goal and thus the higher optimal values V * (s) since this value is the negative of the path length. Figure 3 shows the trade-off between the value achieved for given information I(S; A) for cases A and B under the self-consistent condition (8) for β ∈ (0, ∞). The top right corner in each graph corresponds to β → ∞, the optimal value E[V * (S)] (shortest path to the goal) and the minimum information required to achieve it. As one reduces β, I(S; A) drops and the policy uses less information about the state S, thus leading to a drop of E[V π (S)]. The limit case is where trade-off curve meets the y-axis and the information I(S; A) becomes 0, the curve intersecting with the vertical axis at the best value that can be achieved by an completely blind agent. In case A (solid curve in Fig. 3) , the optimal policy requires a relevant information of ≈ 0.166 bit, achieving a value of ≈ −10.1. The other extreme case of a blind agent with I(S; A) → 0, achieved by a policy which selects a north or east move with probability 0.5 each, still reaches a value of ≈ −14.5, and is thus reasonably effective in reaching the goal.
In case B, the optimal strategy achieves a better value of −5.5, since the target state is in the center of the square. However, compared to A, this comes at the price of a considerably higher amount of relevant information, namely of I(S; A) ≈ 1.17 bit per step taken. This effect becomes even more pronounced when one moves on the trade-off curve towards the limit of blind agents I(S; A) → 0. The value in this case goes towards ≈ −205 (outside of the Figure) and the corresponding strategy becomes a purely random walk. The trade-off curve (dashed curve in Fig. 3) for B lies mostly to the right and below that for A. This indicates that case B is, for most of the part far less favourable than case A in terms of "value for information". We will return to these observations.
B. Value-Information Trade-Offs for Relabeled Actions
In the scenarios of Sec. V-A, we varied the goal state between the corner of the world and the centre. In the scenario of the present section, however, we are going to investigate another effect.
1) Action Relabeling: Qualitative Description:
In the scenario from Sec. V the agent performed actions north, east, south or west which we implied to have the usual effect in the grid world. However, there is nothing in the formalism of MDPs that requires "north", "east", "south" or "west" to "mean" the same operation in each state: these are merely labels of the four actions available to the agent in each state of the world. Intuitively, when we consider an agent "embodied", even in a grid world, we mean action north to effect roughly the same operation in each state (with exception of the wall and the goal). However, the bare MDP formalism allows us to take a "platonic" stance and to assume that the four action directions are just arbitrary labels attached to the actions available to the agent in the current state, with no discernible consistency over different states. More precisely: consider two scenarios, one is the original case A, with the goal in the corner, and the actions labeling the directions of movement in the traditional way. In the second, however, keep the world unchanged, but rename the labels for the four actions in each grid state randomly north, east, south and west. This random relabeling is done before the learning run is carried out, the world remains fully deterministic for the agent; the only change is that there is no consistency in the action labels throughout the grid. In other words, the agent embodiment does no longer "carry its actions with it". s,a , where σ s is a permutation A → A of the actions which is, in general, different for each s ∈ S. In the special case of σ s being the identity permutation for all states s ∈ S, we reobtain the original MDP.
2) Action
Importantly, from the point of pure MDP optimization, any relabeling of actions is completely irrelevant. Optimal policies can be computed with the usual value iteration (2) , and the resulting values are independent of the relabeling, i.e. one has V * (s) = V * (s) for all s ∈ S if V * is the optimal value function for the relabeled MDP. More generally, if we operate with a general policy π and consider the Q-function, the Qvalues of the original MDP can be related to the new one via the transformation
In other words, with the exception of an appropriate relabeling of the actions in each state s for a given policy, the relabeled MDP is precisely equivalent to the original one. This is a "platonic" view of the traditional MDP picture: no matter how the "embodiment" (in form of action labels) is modified, it has no consequences for solving the task optimally.
3) Informational Consequences of Action Relabeling:
However, once we include the information processing cost into the consideration, this changes drastically. Figure 4 repeats the earlier trade-off curve from Fig. 3 between value and information for case A (solid line) where actions north, east, south, west correspond to the usual directions. The dashed line shows now the new trade-off curve for caseÃ, where the actions have been relabeled for each state with a different random, but fixed permutation.
The optimal value for case A had been ≈ −10.1 (Sec. V-A), and this is also the optimal value achieved in the relabeled scenario of caseÃ, consistently with the discussion in Sec. V-B2. Now, the differences: while the optimal value E[V * (S)] achieved (top-right positions of both curves) Note that the optimal value achieved is the same for case A (solid line, same as in Fig. 3 ) and caseÃ (dashed line), but at a much higher information cost for caseÃ and generally that curves lies below and right, thus unfavourably to the trade-off curve for case A.
is exactly the same for both scenarios, the trade-off curve for the randomly relabeled MDP (Ã) lies far below and to the right to that for A. In particular, for the optimal policy,Ã requires more than 1.1 bit of information per step. In other words, for the same optimal performance, much more information intake is required in caseÃ. And note that, without being aware of the the action relabeling, an external observer just watching the agent from outside would not reveal any difference in optimal strategy between A andÃ. But, when one now moves towards vanishing I(S; A), i.e. towards the blind agent, the value drops rapidly 6 to below −222, performing at around the level of the blind agent in case B.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results show that minor changes in an MDP can induce drastically different outcomes in the informational "metabolism" of the agent. In cases A and B clearly the goal in the center is reachable by a slightly shorter average shortest path length than the goal in the corner. However, B requires significantly more information to achieve the optimal solution than A. The effect becomes more pronounced once we reduce information bandwidth. In this case, the achievable value for B drops off very rapidly compared to A. For A, the environment in form of the wall boundary of the grid helps the agent find the corner goal. Even blindly, the agent can randomly select north and east actions, the walls guiding it as a funnel towards the goal. For the center goal, however, the environment can no longer support the agent in finding the goal: here, a blind agent cannot hope to do better than a random walk.
The role of embodiment in relieving the agent's cognitive burden becomes even more striking in caseÃ. All that is dropped from A toÃ is the consistency of actions ("directions") over the states. From an MDP point of view these are exactly equivalent cases. However, once the cognitive burden is included into the consideration,Ã is informationally disadvantaged to A. Not only does the optimal case β → ∞ require significantly more information per step forÃ, but also, once one moves towards a blind agent, it performs no better than B. Although still in the corner, unlike in A, iñ A the goal cannot be longer found by the increasingly blinded agent using the wall as "funnel". Instead, the agent needs much more state information to select the two actions which, in the given state, would correspond to the north/east actions of the original case A. This requires a much larger information intake inÃ, finally leading to the completely uninformed random walk of the fully blinded agent. All that distinguishes case A andÃ is how the selected action is carried out in the agent's environment.
Concludingly, the results provide a prime illustration of the principle of environmental, and more specifically of embodied computation in how embodiment, already in the abstracted view adopted in the present paper, can help the performance of an agent, once the cognitive burden is taken into consideration. Importantly, the presented formalism, apart from numerical and technical aspects, is generic and applicable to much more general (e.g. continuous-valued) contexts. Finally, note that what could appear as a mere "relabeling" of actions needs to be seen in the context of evolution: if it reduces the cognitive load, we expect an evolutionary pressure towards informationally convenient labelings that allow actions to be transported "consistently" through space. In turn, the fact that such consistent labelings, which one might be tempted to take for granted, exist, imply a deeply ingrained structure of the physical world in which agents typically live and evolve.
